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All people are the same. It is only their habits that are different.
Confucius
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ....................................... ........ 484
LEGAL REGULATION OF JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-
UNSUCCESSFUL ADOPTION OF THE AMERICAN MODEL............486
NON-LEGAL NORMS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ................ 487
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE MODEL...................... 489
Concept of Cross-Shareholding............................... 490
Concept ofLong-Term Employment ................... 491
ECONOMIC THEORIES ............................ ...... 492
Keiretsu as Protection Mechanism .............. ...... 492
Long-Term Employment-Development of the Doctrine of
Abusive Dismissal. ....................... ..... 493
CULTURAL THEORIES ......................................... 495
Keiretsu as Traditional Way ofDoing Things.... ........... 495
Long-Term Employment-Company as Family ...... ...... 496
DUALISM OF LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL NORMS IN JAPAN ..... ..... 498
ROLE OF LEGAL NORMS ...................................... 498
ROLE OF NON-LEGAL NORMS ................... ..... ....... 501
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL NORMS................. 503
PRESENT TENDENCIES ............................... ...... 506
Keiretsu ............................................... 506
* Professor of Law, Kyushu University; caslav@law.kyushu-u.ac.jp. The author is
grateful to (in alphabetical order) Dan Puchniak from the National University of
Singapore, Dimitri Vanoverbeke from Catholic University of Leuven, Junko Ueda from
Kyushu University and Masashi Kitamura from Kyoto University for their valuable
comments and suggestions which helped to refine this article. Of course, I remain
responsible for all eventual errors in this article.
483
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Long-Term Employment ................................ 507
Legal Reform of Corporate Governance ................ 508
FACTORS OF CHANGE .......................................... 511
Social Factors .................................. 511
Political Factors ............................ ..... 512
Economic Factors ....................................... 514
Legalfactors .............................. ..... 515
LIMITATION FACTORS ......................................... 515
POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS ............................ 518
CONCLUSION ............................................ ...... 520
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance may be analyzed from different perspectives,
one of them being its legal aspect. However, instead of examining legal
rules regarding corporate governance, this paper will analyze the
relationship between non-legal norms and corporate governance focusing
on the influence that non-legal norms have on the way corporate
governance functions in Japan.
Japanese corporate governance has often been the subject of
attention of foreign scholars, particularly in debates on the comparative
aspects of corporate governance.' The main focus is usually on the rules
regulating corporate governance and legal reforms affecting those rules.
The main bank system, cross-shareholding and long-term employment
are usually mentioned as typical features of the Japanese model of
2corporate governance.
The current literature on Japanese corporate governance often relies
on contrasting arguments. Some scholars suggest that it is fundamentally
different from Western patterns and its character is determined by the
unique Japanese culture. The opposing view disputes this explanation by
focusing on economic, legal and political factors, and arguing that these
factors are the primary force driving Japanese corporate governance.
This bipolar approach is also present in discussions related to other areas
1. For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Luke Nottage, Perspectives
and Approaches: A Framework for Comparing Japanese Corporate Governance, in
LUKE NOTTAGE, LEON WOLFF & KENT ANDERSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 2 1sT
CENTURY JAPAN'S GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION, 21-52 (Edward Elgar Publ. 2008).
2. Dan W. Puchniak, The 2002 Reform of the Management of Large Corporations
in Japan, 5 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 42, 46-47 (2003).
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of Japanese law and practice, such as various theories concerning the low
litigation rate in Japan.
The objective of this paper is to highlight the background of
corporate governance in Japan by taking all dominant factors into
consideration in light of arguments relied upon by competing theories.
This paper will analyze economic, political and legal factors that have
contributed to the development of the Japanese model of corporate
governance. Particular attention will be given to exploring the world of
corporate governance that exists behind the legal norms, focusing
primarily on the influence that Japanese social norms have on corporate
governance. Such an analysis of the impact of the non-legal norms on
corporate governance may provide new insights into the way culture
interacts with legal norms in Japan and may contribute to a better
understanding of the way in which Japan is currently adapting the system
of corporate governance to its evolving business environment.
A broader objective of this paper relates to a general lack of a
comprehensive analysis of the effect of non-legal norms on corporate
governance in the wider corporate governance literature. This paper
suggests that the cultural lens should not be forgotten when attempting to
understand how disparate systems of corporate governance work in
practice. In this sense, the overall goal of this paper is not just to
contribute to Japanese corporate governance literature but to the
understanding of corporate governance as a whole.
This paper will first address the basic structure and principle of
Japanese corporate governance by giving an overview of both the legal
regulation and non-legal norms used in Japanese corporate governance.
Then, it will analyze the influences of both the non-legal and legal norms
on corporate governance in the light of arguments relied upon by
competing economic and cultural theories. The last portion will explore
the prospects for changes in the corporate governance in Japan as a
consequence of economic decline in recent years, both with respect to the
legal regulations and practices based on non-legal norms. Finally, the
paper will conclude by evaluating the possible directions of the evolution
of Japanese corporate governance in the future.
3. For a cultural view, see Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in
Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 41-
72 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1963). For an opposite view arguing that low rate of
litigation is related to rational choice, see John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant
Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978); J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant
Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988); Takao
Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24
L. Soc. REv. 651 (1990).
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LEGAL REGULATION OF JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-
UNSUCCESSFUL ADOPTION OF THE AMERICAN MODEL
After Japan opened its doors to the outside world in the mid-
nineteenth century, it embarked on a process of modernization, but with
a clear strategy to preserve its own values while importing Western
technology under the slogan "Japanese spirit, Western skills" (wakon
yosai). This approach was buttressed by the Japanese educational system
which continued to cultivate traditional values.
Relating to the Japanese legal system, there are two sets of rules in
Japan that have co-existed for over a hundred years: (1) legal norms
transplanted from the Western legal system, and (2) traditional informal
norms. The Japanese legal system is based on legal transplants originally
imported from Germany.4 In the post-war period, particularly in the area
of corporate law, Japanese law made a distinct move towards the
American model.5  The genesis of the Americanization of Japanese
corporate law came during the occupation period, when American law
heavily influenced major revisions to Japan's black letter corporate
law-which were aimed at implementing a US-style shareholder primacy
model. American influence was also dominant after the economic
"bubble burst" in the 1990's.6 In Japan's post-bubble era, discussions
surrounding a new approach to corporate governance often gravitated
towards the need to adopt "global standards" in corporate-governance
reforms. The idea of adopting "global standards" was typically
understood as a thinly veiled disguise for adopting American standards.7
Adoption of the American model into Japanese business culture was
unsuccessful. While in the post-war period Japan adopted corporate
governance structures and rules based on American corporate law, in
practice, they deviated substantially from the American model.
Dependence on banks for financing, cross-shareholding, as well as the
4. There are several reasons for the choice of German law, related to suitability for
Japan. See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 27-29 (Butterworths, 1992).
5. Hiroko Aoki, Revisions of Corporate Law, ZJAPANR 97, 99 (2001).
6. Id. at 101.
7. Christina Ahmadjian, Changing Japanese Corporate Governance, in JAPAN'S
MANAGED GLOBALIZATION: ADAPTING TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 222 (Ulrike
Schaede & William W. Grimes eds., East Gate Book 2002).
8. For an explanation of how the corporate-law provisions in the Commercial Code
were redrafted during the American occupation period to reflect US corporate law, see
Thomas L. Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions:
Concerning Corporations, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 12 (1953). For an explanation of the
significant gap between the US-style corporate law in Japan's Commercial Code and its
application in practice, see Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The
Hidden Problems of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 189 (2000).
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long-term employment system, all developed in the post-war period
when Japan was supposedly following the American model. Each of
these essential features of the Japanese corporate governance model is in
clear contrast to the American model. One of the paradoxes of the
Japanese model is that during the period when the model was
presumably under the influence of American-style black letter corporate
law, it actually diverged from the American model. Some commentators
described this divergence as a puzzle.9 This text will attempt to find
answers to this puzzle.
NON-LEGAL NORMS 10 AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
All states have a set of rules embodied in codes, statutes or court
cases that represent the formal legal order. Besides this formal set of
rules, there is a separate set of non-legal norms that also play a role in the
governance of society. According to Lawrence Friedman," a legal
system includes three basic components: (a) structural component,
which means "the institutions themselves" such as courts; (b) substantive
component, such as 'laws themselves' applied by the courts (both
substantive and procedural); and (c) cultural component, which refers to
"the values and attitudes that bind system together, and which determines
the place of the legal system in the culture of the society as a whole."
Legal culture embodied in non-legal norms is most difficult to define, as
it is not so visible and accessible compared to other two components.
Legal systems are embedded in particular cultures that have their
own value systems. Non-legal norms are usually based on traditional
ways of doing things in a society and rely on moral values, such as trust
and reputation. In societies where values, language, meaning, traditions
and customs are shared, non-legal norms based on personal relationships
play a more prominent role. These norms may also play important role
in determining the actual implementation of the formal legal rules. They
may be of key importance for understanding the law in action, since they
determine when, why, where and how people use law and legal
institutions. As those norms are stronger and more important in a
9. Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and
Explanations from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527 (2001).
10. In the context of this text, the term "legal norms" is understood as legal rules and
standards articulated through formal institutional processes by legislatures, courts and
administrative agencies as opposed to the "non-legal norms" understood as rules that
evolved through a social custom or tradition without being recognized as legal rules by
formal institutions.
11. Lawrence Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 L. & Soc. 29, 34
(1969).
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society, so will the implementation of formal legal rules be weaker and
less effective.
Despite the various debates on comparative corporate governance,
there have been remarkably few analyses of the role of non-legal norms
in corporate law and practice. Many scholars writing about the legal
aspect of Japanese corporate governance are aware of the cultural aspect
but for various reasons have limited their analysis to the legal aspect
only, or have only vaguely touched upon non-legal norms.12  The
question that has not been sufficiently explored by the literature is: in
what way do non-legal norms influence the corporate governance system
of individual countries?
The Japanese model of corporate governance, on its surface,
resembles many other models. Although there are several differences
between the models of corporate governance of the United States and
Japan, they still maintain the same basic structure. According to one
leading Japanese legal scholar, the Japanese law resembles more the
Anglo-Saxon shareholder-value model than the stakeholder model.' 3
However, this similarity is just in form. Behind the fagade of legal
norms that purport to regulate corporate governance, there exists the real
world of corporate governance which is governed not only by legal
norms, but also by non-legal norms that are in many respects far more
important.
An analysis of the Japanese legal regulations of corporate
governance, which would be separated from the social realities, is bound
to fail in its attempt to fully understand the Japanese corporate
governance system. It may only reveal the rules, but not their life in the
real world of practice concerning how they are applied, and how they
function and shape the Japanese corporate world.
The role of non-legal norms in corporate governance has recently
attracted the attention of some legal scholars.14 Curtis Milhaupt's paper
The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance is
one of those few attempts focusing on the non-legal rules in Japanese
12. For example, Puchniak mentions culture briefly in his analysis of the role of
hostile takeovers in post-war Japanese corporate governance but does not undertake an in
depth analysis of the historical roots of Japanese culture and how traditional culture may
have prevented hostile takeovers. Dan W. Puchniak, The Efficiency of Friendliness:
Japanese Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, 5
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 195, 227-28, 259-60 (2008).
13. Takashi Araki, Changing Employment Practices, Corporate Governance, and
the Role ofLabor Law in Japan, 28 CoMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y J. 251, 263 (2007).
14. On recent texts that examine the interrelation between law and culture, see Luke
Nottage, The Cultural (Re)turn in Japanese Law Studies, 39 VICT. U. WELL. L. REv. 755
(2008).
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corporate governance.' Milhaupt focuses on non-legal norms-in the
sense that they are features of Japanese corporate governance that are not
based on law but play a very important role in corporate governance.
This paper will look at the issues arising from the link between Japanese
culture and Japanese corporate governance, but from a different
perspective than Milhaupt, and will provide, in some cases, different
conclusions. More specifically, this paper will attempt to explain the
background of those non-legal norms, as well as provide a more detailed
elaboration on the way they affect functioning of corporate governance
in practice.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE MODEL
Japan has adopted Western legal institutions since the Meji period,
but these institutions have not operated in the same manner as in the
West. The legal form was adopted from the West, but the way of doing
things maintained a distinctive Japanese flavor. Despite its "shareholder
model" form, Japanese corporate governance is, in essence, much closer
to the "stakeholder model" with particular attention being given to the
protection of employees. The idea that companies should be managed
dominantly in the interest of shareholders is in contradiction with the
prevailing understanding of corporate governance in Japan. While
capital is certainly important, the Japanese system gives greater
importance to the labor and efforts of employees, since they play a
crucial role in the development of a company. In fact, the company and
its well-being are the central focus of the Japanese system, and the
company comes before both shareholders and employees. So, maybe it
is more accurate to say that Japanese system is focused more on the
company, rather than on the employees.
.The most typical features of the Japanese model of corporate
governance include: the main bank system, cross-shareholding, long-
term employment, and the close relationship between the business elite
and the government.16 There are competing theories that attempt to
15. Curtis Milhaupt, The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate
Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2083 (2001).
16. There is a general consensus in the literature that the main bank, keiretsu and
lifetime employment are the three central features of Japan's post-war system of
corporate governance. However, two of the most prominent Japanese corporate
governance scholars, Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer, have recently published
numerous articles and a book which suggest that all of the central features of Japanese
corporate governance are "academic myths" (i.e., they do not exist). For an example, see
YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF KEIRETSU (U. Chi. Press, 2006);
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 401 (2002). For a critique
of Miwa and Ramseyer's contrarian research-which also supports the general view
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explain the character of these features by relying on different rationales,
such as economic, legal and political factors on one side, and culture on
another. We shall use keiretsu, or cross-shareholding, and long-term
employment as case studies to compare the arguments of these theories.
Concept of Cross-Shareholding
The structure of a large publicly traded company is traditionally
characterized by cross-shareholding (keiretsu), referring to mutual
shareholding through which a number of companies are interconnected
in a network where each of them holds shares in the other companies.' 7
In addition, the shares are also held by banks, life-insurance companies,
individual shareholders and foreign investors.
Keiretsu literally means "economic line-ups" and includes
something more than what is just covered by the concept of cross-
shareholding. Keiretsu is a structural arrangement of Japanese firms
characterized by close business relationships intertwined with long-term
commitments among members. There are various types of keiretsu, but
the main type is the keiretsu corporate group (sometimes called
"gurupu"), with the main bank at the center.18
Normally, the shares held under these ongoing stable shareholding
arrangements constitute the controlling portion of the firm's shares.' 9
There is a mutual understanding between the companies that these shares
are not to be traded, but to be kept as a safety mechanism.20 Member
companies within a keiretsu offer each other preferential treatment in
commercial and financial transactions. They may exchange information
through the main bank and, in times of crisis, they are expected to help
each other.
Concept of keiretsu is of crucial importance for understanding the
Japanese model. The fact that most of Japanese large companies are
taken in this paper that the central features of Japanese corporate governance do indeed
exist-see Dan W. Puchniak, A Skeptic's Guide to Miwa and Ramseyer's 'The Fable of
the Keiretsu,' 12 J. JAPANESE LAW 273 (2007); Dan W. Puchniak, Perverse Main Bank
Rescue in the Lost Decade: Proof that Unique Institutional Incentives Drive Japanese
Corporate Governance, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 13 (2007).
17. Keiretsu is the term usually used in the English literature to denote cross-
shareholding. In Japanese, cross-shareholding is usually called "mochiai" or "kabushiki
mochiai, " while the term "keiretsu" refers to the network of companies.
18. Six major keiretsu groups are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai Ichi
Kingyo and Sanwa.
19. For an explanation of the efficiency of the keiretsu system, see Ronald J. Gilson
& Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate
Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993).
20. In Japan, a distinction is made between investment shareholding and mutual
shareholding. The first one involves trading on the stock market, while the second means
that shares are not traded but are used to cement the relationship and prevent takeovers.
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owned by other companies and banks, which are also owned not by
classic types of shareholders, but by other companies in the same
keiretsu raises the question: who really owns these companies and
banks? In a sense, private ownership as an essential ingredient of
capitalism is lacking in the Japanese model.
Concept ofLong-Term Employment
Long-term employment is another typical feature of the Japanese
model. Under this system, which is not regulated by any particular law
but is based on informal norms and practice, an employee is recruited
directly from school or university and is expected to remain in the
company's employ for the length of his or her career. In return, he or she
can expect not to be fired or discharged, except under some extraordinary
circumstances. 2 1  The basis of this agreement is the commitment of
employers to provide secure employment to their employees in return for
loyalty and "lifetime" service. The employer can rely on loyal
employees and their dedication to work hard in exchange for the
investment in their training. As a part of this system, the promotion of
employees within the hierarchy of the company and the wages paid are
based on the principle of seniority.22
The mandatory retirement (teinen) system is an essential element of
long-term employment. Historically, in the post-war period, the
retirement age has been 55 years old. However, recent amendments to
Japan's labor law mandate that it now must be 60 or higher.23 Presently
most companies fix the age of retirement between 60 and 65.24 This
system typically applies to workers in major Japanese companies but is
far less present in small companies.
Long-term employment does not mean a formal obligation of the
company not to dismiss its employees, nor does it mean that the
company does not dismiss employees as this happens in practice.
21. JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK JR., KAISHA-THE JAPANESE
CORPORATION, 183-88, 191-92, 194-206 (Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo 1985); see
also Takashi Araki, supra note 12, 251-52; Roland Gilson & Mark Roe, Lifetime
Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 508 (1999).
22. John Haley, a leading Japanese law scholar, has recently expressed the view that
Japan's long-term employment system is the critical feature that defines Japanese
corporate governance and makes it unique from other systems of corporate governance
around the world. John 0. Haley, Career Employment, Corporate Governance and
Japanese Exceptionalism (Faculty Working Paper Series, Paper No. 04-04-01, 2004).
23. Act Concerning Stabilization of Employment of Older Persons, Law No. 103 of
2004], art. 8. This Act entered into force on April 1, 2006.
24. Gerald Paul McAlinn, Employment and Labor, in JAPENESE BuSINESs LAw 403,
424 (Gerald Paul McAlinn, ed., 2007).
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Rather, long-term employment should be understood in the sense that the
company will not resort to layoffs unless it is in deep economic crisis and
layoffs are the only possible way to keep the company afloat and prevent
bankruptcy. 25 Even in times of crisis, such as the oil shock crises, or
more recently in the time of "lost decade," companies used other
mechanisms aimed at avoiding layoffs, such as the reduction of overtime
and assigning employees to affiliated companies.
Long-term employment, in the sense of spending the whole career
in the same company, is not really unique to Japan since such patterns
exist in many other countries, as well. However, relying merely on the
numbers and statistics to prove that the Japanese model is not different
from other long-term employment patterns misses the point. The essence
of the Japanese model of long-term employment is not in the numbers,
but in its character. There are several elements of the long-term
employment system that are typical for Japan, such as the way of
recruiting graduates, 26 seniority-based wages, internal transfers based on
a rotation system and on-the-job training, which result in firm-specific
skills, making it extremely difficult for employees to move to other
firms. These features make Japanese long-term employment qualitatively
different from the corresponding patterns in most other countries.
ECONOMIC THEORIES 27
Keiretsu as Protection Mechanism
Economic theories emphasize economic rationales, as well as legal
and political factors, as being the key factors in establishing keiretsu.
They point out the fact that individual shareholding decreased while the
shareholding of financial institutions and corporations increased after the
1950s and particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. In the post-war period,
individual shareholding fell from 69.1% in 1949 to 23.9% in 1986, while
the ratio of shareholding by financial institutions increased from 9.9% in
1949 to 41.7% in 1986, and the ratio of shareholding by corporations
25. Leon Wolf, The Death of Lifelong Employment in Japan? in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY JAPAN'S GRADUAL TRANSOFRMATION, supra note 1, at
53, 77.
26. Practice of simultaneous recruiting of new graduates (shinsotsu-ikkatsu-saiyd)
and the way of applying for jobs by the students (shfishoku katsud6) seem to be unique to
Japan and S. Korea.
27. "Economic theories" is not really an appropriate term, since in this text the
theories covered by this term also include theories that emphasize legal and political
factors. This term is chosen as a matter of convenience to distinguish all other theories
from the theories that emphasize cultural factors.
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increased from 5.6% in 1949 to 24.5% in 1986.28 This trend was a result
of the easing of restrictions on ownership of shares by financial
institutions and corporations due to the revision of the Anti-Monopoly
Act of 1947.29 After the initial period in the 1950's, when the Anti-
Monopoly Act of 1947 prohibited stockholding by companies, things
radically changed in the 1960s. Japan became a member of the OECD in
1964, and one of the conditions for membership was the deregulation of
its financial market. As the government relaxed the entry of foreign
capital into the country, there was a growing concern about possible
takeovers of Japanese companies by foreign companies.
As a response to the liberalization of the country's markets, large
Japanese corporations created a defense mechanism by establishing a
stable shareholding system with the participation of "friendly
companies."3 0  Following these changes, the Commercial Code was
revised to allow the issuance of new shares to companies, leading to the
concentration of shareholdings in the hands of banks and corporations
and the creation of keiretsu, which contributed to the relatively stable and
concentrated ownership structure of Japanese companies. Logically, this
resulted in a substantial reduction of individual shareholdings as the
shares became concentrated in a small group of financial organizations
and corporations. Thus, the keiretsu was made possible by government
action which was behind the regulations allowing shareholdings by
companies.
Long-Term Employment-Development of the Doctrine ofAbusive
Dismissal
Economic theories dispute the cultural roots of long-term
employment by pointing out the fact that it did not exist as a firmly
established system in the time between the two World Wars. The origins
of the long-term employment concept date from the early part of
twentieth century, when it gradually developed as a business strategy to
avoid the high fluctuation of workers that created difficulties for
companies, particularly in key industries such as iron and steel.3 1 To
28. MASAHIKO AOKi, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE
ECONOMY 116-119 (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
29. Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade,
Law No. 54 of April 14, 1947.
30. Takashi Araki, Corporate Governance Reforms and Labor and Employment
Relations in Japan: Whither Japan's practice-dependent Shareholder Model? I U.
TOKYO J. L. & POL. 45, 50 (2004).
31. Reiko Okayama, Industrial Relations in Great Britain and Japan from the 1880s
to the 1920s, in LABOR AND MANAGEMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
BusiNEss HISTORY 207, 227 (Keiichiro Nakagawa ed., 1979).
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solve that problem, companies started to offer incentives designed to
encourage experienced workers to stay, such as increased wages based
on seniority and hefty retirement allowances for long-term workers.32
An ideological justification for the long-term employment relationship
developed afterwards, tying it to Confucian notions of reciprocal
obligations. At the start, however, long-term employment was, in fact, a
new strategy based on rational economic choice by employers.33 The
system was first institutionalized only in the 1950s and became popular
in the 1970s.34 The modem long-term employment system was allegedly
designed as a result of a compromise entered in to between management
and unions aimed at overcoming existing labor problems, being a
mutually beneficial bargain rather than as a solution imposed by social
norms. 35
Long-term employment in its present form developed as result of
economic benefits. It contributed to a greater productivity that benefited
both the shareholders and management through higher profits, as well as
labor through greater employment security. It has also been argued that
since long-term employment affects only a portion of employees and is
not universal, it cannot be based on culture, because culture assumes a
set of norms and practices that are universal.36
Political factors also played a role in the development of long-term
employment in Japan. The legal framework that developed during the
same period and supported long-term employment was arguably based
on a government policy that encouraged the long-term employment
practice. The government supported lifetime employment because it
contributed to reducing the tensions between employers and employees
that in case of escalation could have caused problems to the peace and
stability of the State.
In parallel with this development, at about the same time, the
Japanese courts developed the doctrine of abusive dismissal. This new
legal doctrine was present in a number of cases starting in 1950s,
restricting the employer's power to dismiss employees. This
development led legal scholars to emphasize the importance of
32. Koji TAIRA, EcoNoMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LABOUR MARKET IN JAPAN 153-160
(Columbia Univ. Press, New York 1970).
33. Id. at 159-60.
34. Id. at 153-60.
35. AOKI, supra note 28, at 3-43.
36. NOTTAGE, WOLFF & ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 63.
37. Sube v. Kariya Seikatsu Kyodo Kumiai (Kariya Cooperative), 2-5 Rominshu
578, 579 (Chisai (Nagoya District Court), Dec. 4, 1951), quoted in Tomio Fukui, Labor
Management Relations and the Law, in LAW IN JAPAN 3-4 (1973); Iwata v. Tokyo Seimei
Hoken Sogo Gaisha (Tokyo Life Insurance Co.), 1-2 Rominshu 230, 235-36 (Chisai
(Tokyo District Court), May 8, 1950.
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restrictions on termination of employment contracts under Japanese labor
law as the factor that contributed to long-term employment.
CULTURAL THEORIES
Keiretsu as Traditional Way of Doing Things
According to the cultural explanation, stable shareholding is related
to the Japanese group mentality.39  The cross-shareholding system .is
deeply rooted in the Japanese group mentality because the Japanese feel
more confident in dealing with people belonging to the same group,
where trust serves as a bond which is considered to be more important
than any legally binding obligation. As a result, Japanese firms have a
tendency to "cluster themselves into groupings of affiliated companies
that extend a broad spectrum of markets." 0
Cultural theories point out the parallel between the traditional
village and the grouping of companies into larger groups of keiretsu with
the appropriate subordinate system in which all companies are
subordinated to their respective presidents (shacho).41 The traditional
village represents a paradigm.4 2 In a traditional Japanese village, there
was a strong bond connecting all the people, and they maintained long-
term mutual relationships. For those people, "it was inconceivable to
live outside [their village]."43 The sense of depending on each other as
members of the community ensures mutual loyalty and provides a sense
of security to the members.
Similar considerations exist in the case of keiretsu. If one company
has difficulties, it is likely to be assisted by other companies from the
same keiretsu (the same as the villagers would help each other in case of
calamities); more powerful companies are expected to support smaller
ones. The sense of obligation towards the company may be linked with
the sense of belonging to a family and the responsibility towards one's
38. MIWA & RAMSEYER, supra note 16, at 159.
39. For a detailed discussion on the link between traditional and modem business
management, see Yasuzo Horie, The Role of the le ($- House) in the Economic
Modernization ofJapan, 36 KYOTO U. ECON. REV. 1 (1966); see also Yotaro Sakudo, The
Management Practices of Family Business, in TOKUGAWA JAPAN: THE SOCIAL AND
EcoNoMIC ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN JAPAN 147-166 (Chie Nakane & Shinzaburo Oishi
eds., University of Tokyo Press, 1990).
40. Michael L. Gerlach, Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical Assessment, in
COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 379-381 (Kenneth L. Port &
Gerald Paul McAlinn eds., Carolina Academic Press, 1996).
41. Horie, supra note 39, at 1-16.
42. JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 14 (1998).
43. RYuSHI IWATA, JAPANESE STYLE MANAGEMENT: ITS FOUNDATIONS AND
PROSPECTS 54 (1982).
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own family." In the same sense, keiretsu also represents a kind of
family with members that feel close to each other. In this sense, keiretsu
is not purely an economic concept but a cultural one, as well.
Long-Term Employment-Company as Family
In contradiction to economic theories which deny the existence of
long-term employment in Japanese tradition, cultural theories rely on the
argument that long-term employment, in fact, has its roots in Japanese
history. The kinship-based economic unit was established in the
Tokugawa period and provided the basis for the long-term employment
system, seniority-based status, which became the basis of the modem
system of employment in Japan.4 5 In the Tokugawa period, Japanese
business entities functioned like family businesses even when the
employer would hire outsiders to manage them.46 The employees were
expected to show loyalty and dedication to the ie so that its name would
be preserved-". . . the employees were trained from their boyhood to
serve the ie (meaning 'home'), and were expected to climb up the ladder
beginning from detchi (Tft-apprentice), through tedai (Of-
assistant manager), to banto ( M-manager)."4 7 This represented the
foundation of long-term employment based on seniority and loyalty to
the company.
Japanese corporate culture is often described as a family system, in
the sense that the Japanese company is based on the principles of a
traditional family. The seeds of this family concept of companies are
deeply rooted in Japanese culture, based on obedience, hierarchy and
loyalty which all make up important elements of Japanese culture.
Originally, the Confucian ethic of the group was typically applied to
relationships in a family, which are traditionally lifetime relationships.
The group concept was extended to the traditional ie and later on to the
firm. le was abolished as a legal unit by revisions of the Civil Code
44. Toru Yoshikawa, Confucian Ethics and Japanese Corporate Practices, E. ASIAN
REV. 59, 65 (1998).
45. Tokugawa period is a division in Japanese history during which Japan was ruled
by shoguns of the Tokugawa family from 1603 to 1868.
46. Yoshikawa, supra note 44, at 62.
47. Horie, supra note 39, at 14. See also, Yotaro Sakudo, The Management
Practices of Family Business, in TOKUGAWA JAPAN: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN JAPAN, 147, 159 (Chie Nakane, Shinzaburo Oishi & Conrad
Totman eds., 1990).
48. KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE AND POLTCs
INA STATELESS NATION 163 (1989).
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made after World War II.4 9 Nevertheless, the concept of ie still exists as
an informal norm of the social structure in Japan. Japanese employees
often refer to their companies as "uchi" (home) to describe the company
where they work.
According to cultural theories, the kaisha (company) symbolizes the
organization where people are not united by contractual relationships, but
it includes an element of association resembling that of a family.50 Of
course, the kaisha provides income that enables the employees to support
themselves and their families, but it also involves an emotional linkage
which may also exist in the West, but usually not so deeply rooted as in
Japan. "The company is the people" is a common saying in Japan.51 By
characterizing itself as a family unit, the company has achieved a greater
level of loyalty between management and employees. Each employee
has an attachment to the company as "my company" (uchi no kaisha), so
that all of the employees, in a sense, represent the company. If someone
does something wrong, there will normally be solidarity between the
employees who will try to protect him or her, because what was done
was done for the company.52
The relationship between an employer and an employee is based on
the hierarchical order in line with Confucian teachings. In return for the
employees' loyalty and devotion to their duties, the employer is expected
to treat them with benevolence.53 It has been recognized that devotion to
the community plays a key role in suppressing individual desires for the
54common welfare of the group.
Culturalist theories argue that one of the main features of Japanese
industrial relations is the identification of employees with the company,
related to a group mentality and the need of employees for a sense of
49. See Yozo Watanabe, The Family and the Law: The Individualistic Premise and
Modern Japanese Family Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY 364, 373 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963).
50. Horie, supra note 39, at 4.
51. CHIE NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY 3 (1973).
52. There has been a substantial number of cover-ups by Japanese companies aimed
at protecting their employees. The Mitsubishi cover-up affair was one of the largest
corporate scandals in Japanese history. In 2000 it was revealed that one of the Japanese
giants, Mitsubishi Motors Corp., had suppressed complaints made by consumers to avoid
massive and expensive recalls. Mitsubishi was forced to admit a systematic cover up of
defect problems in its vehicles. In 1995 one of Daiwa Bank's bond traders, Toshihide
Iguchi, in New York lost $1.1 billion speculating in the bond market. The company was
later indicted for not reporting crimes by Iguchi including unauthorized sales of clients'
securities to cover losses.
53. Yoshikawa, supra note 44, at 61.
54. For more details, see Kunio Odaka, The Source of Japanese Management, in
JAPANESE BUSINESS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 19, 19-24 (Subhash Durlabhji, Norton E.
Marks & Scott Roach eds., 1993).
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belonging to a peer group.55 Working in a company is considered to be a
part of one's identity, and by moving to another company, a person feels
deprived of an important part of his or her identity. It is often said in
Japan that an employee chooses a company, not a profession. Entry into
the company is viewed as "being born again into another family." 56
Personal interrelationships give a feeling of belonging to a group
(nakama ishiki) and security to the individual, but they may also result in
a feeling of dependence. Community in Japan may be best understood in
terms of mutual interdependency and a shared sense of belonging to a
community or group. The Japanese people even evaluate each other on
the basis of the group they are affiliated with, making them very
sensitive about the reputation and prestige of their group.57
DUALISM OF LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL NORMS IN JAPAN
The co-existence of non-legal and legal norms emphasizes the
confusion and requires that both sets of rules be taken into account
simultaneously. In Japan, as well as in some other Asian nations
influenced by Confucianism," there is a stronger emphasis on
community interests at the expense of individual ones, and more
importance is given to moral norms at the expense of legal norms.59
Regulations of corporate governance represent, to a certain extent, just
the fagade behind which there exists a world that has its own life and
logic far removed from its outside appearance. Consequently, there are
two sets of rules in Japan that have co-existed for more than a century,
such as the legal system imported from the West and the traditional rules.
ROLE OF LEGAL NORMS
The way in which corporate governance functions in Japan raises
the issue of the role of law in Japan, and specifically corporate law. By
giving dominant importance to the role of social norms, cultural theories
implicitly downplay the importance of law within the society. There is a
55. NAKANE, supra note 51, at 11.
56. ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 21, at 200.
57. Sankei Shimada, the executive director of Nissho Iwai Trading Company who
committed suicide following Douglas-Graman affair, wrote the famous note before
leaping from the building to his death: "The life of the company is eternal. For that
immortality we must sacrifice ourselves."
58. For example, China, S. Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam.
59. TOGUKAWA JAPAN: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN
JAPAN (Chie Nakane, Shinzaburo Oishi & Conrad Totman, eds., Univ. of Tokyo Press
1990); JAPAN: EcoNOMIC SUCCESS AND LEGAL SYSTEM (Harald Baum, ed., Walter De
Gryter, 1997); CONFUCIAN TRADITIONS IN EAST ASIAN MODERNITY: MORAL EDUCATION
AND ECONOMIC CULTURE IN JAPAN AND THE FOUR MINI-DRAGONS (Tu Wei-Ming ed.,
1996).
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view that law is largely irrelevant to the social and economic
organization in Japan. 60 Some scholars even doubt that legal reforms can
be effective due to social and cultural constraints.6 1
In contrast, the majority of scholars attach great importance to the
role of law. The increase of derivative suits in Japan has been used as an
illustration of the relevance of law within the country. 6 2 The sudden
increase in shareholder derivative suits almost immediately after a
reduction in the filing fees in the early 1990s, as noted by Mark West,6 3
illustrates the importance of these legal rules.
The argument that the number of derivative suits has substantially
increased after the lowering of court fees has strong persuasive force.
However, this argument should be taken with some reservations. A
logical question that may be asked is: would the number of derivative
suits be equally high if the court fees were equally low when the law on
derivative suits was enacted? The answer might be "no," because the
issue of the litigation rate is too complex to be explained by relying only
on the amount of court fees. Litigation rates were traditionally low in
Japan, and only in recent decades has there been an increase in Japan's
litigation rate without changes in the court fees.64
This example, which is emphasized as evidence that the law
matters, can be seen from the opposite perspective-that the law does not
play a very important role and that the rise of derivative suits has
received so much scholarly attention because it is a deviation from the
norm. In any case, the increase in derivative suits can be at least an
illustration of a possible change in traditional attitudes towards law.
The role of law in Japan has not been so visible during a long period
despite its existence on the books. Derivative suits remained dormant for
several decades after being introduced into Japanese corporate law,
despite the fact that many opportunities for such suits existed in response
60. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 3
(Oxford Press 2004).
61. Philip Lochner, Corporate Japan: Beginning of a New Era, Columbia
Conference held on March 23, 2001 (quoted in id. at 198).
62. Between 1950 and 1990 there were fewer than twenty derivative suits. Since the
fee for filing derivative suits was reduced by law to the modest amount of 8,000 yen,
there has been a huge increase of derivative suits. By the end of 1999, there were 286
derivative suits, ninety-nine of which were filed in 1999 alone.
63. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351, 353 (2001). See also Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of
Law in Japanese Corporate Governance: Evidence From the Daiwa Bank Shareholder
Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 11 (2003).
64. See the statistics in Tom Ginsburg &, Glen Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant?
An Empirical Analysis ofJapan's Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 37 (2006).
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to various managerial abuses. 5 Similarly, securities laws existed but
were not often used in practice, despite widespread insider trading
practices and market abuses.66 Antitrust laws existed but did little to
prevent widespread bid-rigging and cartels. The legal infrastructure for
hostile takeovers existed, although not well developed, but Japan has
remained largely free of hostile takeovers.6 8 Recently, however, there
have been many court cases concerning hostile takeovers (in terms of
proxy fights, inspection of target company's books, selling out dissenting
shares at a fair value, etc). 6 9  These examples of extended stagnation
illustrate the fact that legal transplants need certain time to take root in a
new environment.70
Despite some skepticism, there should be no doubt that the law
plays a very important role in modern Japan. All modern societies are
law-driven societies whether they use statutes, decrees, ordinances,
administrative guidelines, or whatever. Japan is not an exception. If the
law did not matter, why would Japanese legislators spend so much time
and energy in revising something that was not relevant? It can be argued
that the functioning of corporate governance depends more on practices
65. In contrast to a low rate of general crimes, in Japan there has been a long list of
corporate crimes. Here are just a few illustrations: Yamaichi Shoken collapsed in 1997
because of off-the-book debts ("tobashi"), a technique for hiding losses. In one of the
largest corporate scandals in Japanese history, in 2000 it was revealed that one of the
Japanese giants, Mitsubishi Motors Corp., had suppressed complaints made by
consumers to avoid massive and expensive recalls. In 1995, one of Daiwa Bank's
traders, Toshihide Iguchi, in New York lost $1.1 billion speculating in the bond market.
Typically, these corporate crimes were not motivated by greediness of managers but by a
desire to protect one's company.
66. Insider Trading Spike Linked to Close Confidants, KYODO NEWS (Sept. 4, 2010),
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100904a2.html.
67. As of 2008, thirteen lawsuits were still pending over 1990s bid rigging for local
government contracts to supply incinerator plants: Builders Settle Damages Suit Over
Bid-Rigging, KYODO NEWS (Apr. 4, 2009), http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
nn20090404a6.html.
68. Puchniak claims that there has not been a single successful hostile-takeover bid
in the post-war period. Puchniak, The Efficiency ofFriendliness, supra note 12, at 195.
69. The greatest attention attracted the famous "Livedoor" case-Nippon Hoso K.K.
v. Raibudoa K.K., Appeal from Injunction Against Issuance of Warrants, Tokyo Koto
Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 23, 2005, 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 125 (Japan).
In this case, the court ordered the provisional injunction against the issuance of stock-
acquisition rights to a third party, for the reason that the relevant takeover action was not
found to be abusive. Another important case was Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund
(Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., Ltd., 1809 SHOJI HoMu 16 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 7,
2007). In this case, the court recognized that almost all shareholders other than the
acquirer had judged that the acquisition of control by the acquirer would be detrimental to
the company's interests and thus the shareholder interests, and affirmed the
implementation of the takeover-defense measure.
70. For the "transplant effect" see an interesting discussion in Katharina Pistor,
Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Evolution of Corporate Law: A
Cross Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791 (2002).
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than on legal rules. On the other hand, even if not vigorously enforced in
all situations, the law has an important persuasive effect. The law, itself,
cannot change things immediately, but its existence is still important for
creating a legal framework that will legitimize one kind of behavior and
prohibit others.
Non-legal norms weaken and are replaced by legal norms as a
society becomes socially, economically and culturally more advanced.
That has already happened in Japan, and this process of change will
continue.
ROLE OF NON-LEGAL NORMS
To understand accurately Japanese corporate governance, it is
critical to understand the way in which non-legal norms impact the
practice of corporate governance. Reasons rooted in the Japanese culture
lie behind the way Japan has integrated foreign legal concepts, including
those related to corporate governance, such as the separation between
ownership and management, the organization of the firm and the way in
which management functions. These concepts cannot be fully
understood if observed in isolation from the larger context of Japanese
social norms.
Long-term employment may be used as an illustration of this
notion. One of the explanations for the development of long-term
employment is that it is based on economic efficiency. Puchniak in his
unpublished doctoral dissertation argued that "(D)espite a myriad of
partial explanations for lifetime employment, the most powerful and
straightforward explanation for its emergence and longevity has largely
been overlooked: lifetime simply makes economic sense." 7 1 However, if
this is the case, why do we not find such a system in any other country in
the West? After all, economic-efficiency theory is normally presumed to
be universally applicable. Puchniak's argument that "lifetime makes
economic sense" makes sense in the case of Japan but not at the
universal level.
According to Milhaupt, "corporate norms may be the product of
interest group dynamics."72 This is one possible explanation which has
some explanatory weight behind it. However, Milhaupt's explanation is
incomplete as it fails to address why such norms arise in Japan, and
whether the emergence of norms such as those related to long-term
employment would be possible, for example, in the United States. If yes,
71. Dan W. Puchniak, Rethinking Comparative Governance: Valuable Lessons from
Japan's Post-Bubble Era, Kyushu University, 306 (2008) (on file with author).
72. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution ofNonlegal Rules
in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2124 (2001).
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then why is there a lack of such norms in the United States, at least in
comparison to their prominence in Japan? If not, then why do such
norms exist in Japan and not in the United States? The most persuasive
answer to these questions can be found in theories that emphasize the
importance of Japan's social norms. The fact that similar patterns of
long-term employment have developed in different situations and under
different circumstances indicates the existence of some integrating factor
that played a role in the structuring of this system in Japan. Such
patterns have not developed in most other parts of the world, at least not
in the form this system existed and exists in Japan, which explains the
difference.
Social values may influence the choice of particular corporate
structures and legal rules out of a larger menu. Those values are deeply
embedded in people's minds and social institutions. As a result,
practices that are compatible with social preferences in other areas are
more likely to work smoothly in a particular society.
Non-legal norms often play a more significant role in Japanese
corporate governance than do formal legal rules.7 4 Even though the non-
legal norms did not play a direct role in the process of creating cross-
shareholding and long-term employment, they certainly had an influence
in the process of their acceptance and integration in the Japanese
economic model. The nature of cross-shareholding and the long-term
employment system are perfectly congruent with Japanese social values,
even if concepts were adopted on account of other considerations. The
concept of long-term employment and the way it operates are familiar to
employees based on their experiences and education outside the
company. So, they tend to easily adjust to their new environment due to
the well known patterns of conduct that they are accustomed to. In a
similar way, cross-shareholding corresponds to the traditional patterns of
cooperation in Japan. The fact that the cross-shareholding and the long-
term employment system solution perfectly suit the Japanese traditional
social norms only enhanced their successful implementation and
functioning in practice.
Cultural theories discussing the influence of non-legal norms
usually emphasize the importance of Confucianism. However, this
argument should be taken with some reservation. Some scholars argue
that Confucianism in Japan was used by the Japanese elite as a kind of
"cultural engineering" for manipulation and social control to promote the
73. Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural
Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 186 (2001).
74. JoHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADOX (Oxford University Press, 1991).
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goals of the elite. According to this view, the metaphor of kaisha as a
family may have been used to create a sense of family relationship
among employees, while the actual reason for this "familistic rhetoric,"
used in a wider context of a "family state," was to enhance managerial
power. Use of the concept of ie was aimed at creating an image of
culture based on relationships and concealing the real reasons. This
kind of argument is more relevant for determining how the culture can be
influenced, than how culture actually affects the business environment.
Even if these patterns developed as result of a cultural engineering, the
cultural explanation still has some weight. The question that can be
asked is: why was such cultural engineering not successful or attempted
in Western countries, but was successful in South Korea, which shares a
similar culture with Japan?77
The role of non-legal norms in shaping the Japanese economic
model should not be overestimated. Particularly, the theories that
emphasize Japanese uniqueness (so-called 'Nihonjinron' theories) should
be taken with a grain of salt.78 While the factor of culture is certainly
important in explaining different patterns of behavior, it is also critical
not to overstate its importance and to avoid stereotypes.
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL NORMS
The formal legal structure governing Japanese corporate governance
is similar to the formal legal structure in many other jurisdictions. In
Japan, however, there is a substantial gap between legal norms and actual
practice.79 This is a constant in Japan-the formal structure is adopted
and then adjusted to the Japanese way of doing things, which continues
to function parallel to the formal system.
Examples of this discrepancy between form and practice can be
seen in the way of the functioning of general shareholders meetings and
the board of directors ("BOD")-both of which demonstrate some
idiosyncratic, culturally based features of Japanese corporate
governance. The way the BOD and general shareholders' meetings
function deviates significantly from the formal rules that regulate them.
Under the law, the BOD is charged with monitoring corporate activities
75. IAN INKSTER, THE JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL EcoNOMY: LATE DEVELOPMENT AND
CULTURAL CAUSATION 82-104 (Routledge 2001).
76. VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 48, at 16.
77. On long-term employment in S. Korea, see Brett M. Kitt, Note, Downsizing
Korea?: The Difficult Demise of Lifetime Employment and the Prospects for Further
Reform, 34 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 537 (2003).
78. PETER N. DALE, THE MYTH OF JAPANESE UNIQUENESS (1986).
79. Zenichi Shishido, supra note 8, at 189; Puchniak, The 2002 Reform, supra note
2, at 52-53.
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and is vested with the authority to make important managerial
decisions.so In practice, however, the BOD has not played this role,
particularly with regard to the monitoring function. One of the key
features (and problems) of corporate governance in Japan is that the
BOD is dominated by the very same executives who are in charge of the
day-to-day operations of the company. Obviously, this kind of
supervision has a flaw, as it makes no sense if the monitors are those
same persons that are to be monitored.
Similarly, despite formally being a supreme organ of the company,
shareholders' meetings have been relegated in practice to merely formal
rituals. Very few shareholders actually attend the meetings. Many
shareholders' meetings in Japan typically take less than thirty minutes to
present business and financial reports, approve the distribution of profits
and elect new directors and auditors. Such general meetings of
shareholders often represent just ceremonies of formality and public
approval of decisions that have already been made in informal fora.
In order to understand the way of functioning of the company
management, it is necessary to understand the process of making
decisions and the role of informal ways of decision-making. In Japan,
the formal processes are rigid and top-down, involving a kind of ritual
formality with importance given to seals, and do not allow much
deviation from the established rules. On the other hand, the informal
processes are far more flexible and have a very different logic, with great
importance given to consensus and collective participation in making a
decision. The efforts made to achieve consensus and avoid disputes are
incorporated in the way decisions are made. This informal way of
making decisions through various forms of meetings and
communications is based on personal relations rather than on formal
ways of communication. As result, the decisions are often not made at
the general meetings of shareholders or the BOD, but at informal places.
Within the keiretsu system there is usually a group of presidents of
corporations who make up the so-called "shacho-kai" (Presidents Club),
an informal organ which meets regularly.8 1 Shacho-kai is an important
venue for fostering ties among the companies belonging to the same
keiretsu. These meetings have, to a certain extent, a mysterious character
since the outsiders do not know what goes on at these meetings, no notes
are taken, and no statements are made officially after those meetings.
Due to the lack of information, there can be various speculations about
the importance of those meetings. Based on available information
80. Article 362 of the Corporation Law ( lUA), Law No. 86/2005.
81. Examples include: Mitsubishi Kinyo Kai, Sumitomo-Hakusui Kai, Mitsui-
Nimoku Kai, Fuji-Fuyo Kai, and Sanwa--Sansui Kai.
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obtained from practitioners, a number of corporate groups, such as
Mitsui and Mitsubishi still hold "shacho-kai" regularly to exchange
information and strengthen their relationships. Apparently, these bodies
never function as a decision-making organ of group companies, though
there are differences in the way they function in different corporate
groups.
Another important informal body that seems to play an important
role in the decision making process is jomukai. Jomukai can be
translated as a "meeting of managing directors" and is aimed at
supporting the BOD. A few senior directors acting as jomukai or a
similar informal management committee actually have the ultimate
decision-making power in a company. Decisions made by such bodies
are usually final, and the confirmation of such decisions at the meetings
of the BOD is purely a formality to satisfy formal requirements.
Although these meetings are not a part of Japan's formal corporate
governance structure, they serve in practice as an important informal
body that discusses the general corporate policy and strategy of the
corporation.
This contradiction between legal and non-legal norms in practice
reduces, to a certain extent, the power of the formal organs of the
company as the real power is exercised in informal ways, largely outside
of those organs. If the general meetings of shareholders and the BOD are
formally in charge of making key decisions for a company, but decisions
are, in fact, being made by the informal bodies and only formally
approved by the general meetings of shareholders, then these informal
bodies actually represent institutions that are in many respects more
relevant than the BOD and the general meetings of shareholders.
The contradiction mentioned above should be taken into account
when the issue of convergence is discussed. Gilson makes a distinction
between a convergence in form and a functional convergence of
corporate governance. 82 According to him, each system of corporate
governance is able to find functional equivalence without formal
convergence. Gilson argues that corporate governance will be subject to
functional convergence even without a formal convergence of legal
rules.83 This can be seen from a completely opposite perspective-that
there can be a formal convergence without a functional convergence.
Japan is a typical example. The choice of an American model does not
mean functional convergence, but only a formal one. The legal reforms
brought about a formal convergence of rules, while the practices have
82. Ronald Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001).
83. See id. at 338.
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remained quite different. Those practices are determined dominantly by
the non-legal norms in clear contrast to the legal norms thereby
demonstrating a functional divergence.
PRESENT TENDENCIES
In present Japanese corporate governance, some trends can be
identified as a result of a number of factors, such as social changes,
economic recession, and legislative actions. These are visible in all areas
related to corporate governance.
Keiretsu
The decline of cross-shareholding in Japan seems to have stopped,
and its demise will probably not happen anytime soon. The keiretsu
system may not change significantly, though some changes have
occurred within the system. While banks have reduced their
shareholdings in the companies, the keiretsu will probably retain its
"safety level" that makes hostile takeovers difficult. Although banks
may not be able to re-establish their participation in cross-shareholding,
such obstacles do not exist in the case of firms, and they have been active
in re-establishing "stable shareholdings." According to a Bloomberg
columnist, "the old practice of cross-shareholdings between companies
and takeover defenses made a roaring comeback" as defensive
mechanisms against hostile takeovers, 84 though the level of cross-
shareholding, even after the increase, was still bellow its bubble peak.
These new trends, however, are mainly a result of the interests of
certain actors, rather than being influenced by the social norms. The
main reason for this revival is the fear of hostile takeovers that increased
after the deregulation of mergers and acquisitions in Japan. The new
Corporation Law of 2005 allowed foreign companies some flexibility in
acquiring Japanese target companies by acquiring the company's
shares.85 However, implementation of the new law was delayed for a
year due to opposition from Japanese companies which feared that the
merger-and-acquisition provisions of the new law might allow hostile
84. William Pesek, Japan 2008 May Put Science Fiction to Shame, BLOOMBERG,
Mar. (Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aZIuNeKsDOQO&refer-columnist pesek. On the recent resurgence of cross-
shareholding, see Keisuke Nitta, On the Resurgence of Cross-Shareholding-Data from
the Fiscal 2008 Survey of Corporate Ownership Structure, available at http://www.nli-
research.co.jp/english/economics/2009/eco09 111 6.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
According to Nitta, the recent resurgence of cross-shareholding is almost exclusively
result of actions by business firms, while banks remained passive (p. 5-6).
85. , Law No. 86/2005.
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takeovers of Japanese companies by foreign firms. Eventually, these
provisions became effective on May 1, 2007, despite the opposition.86
With respect to ownership structure, they have probably been the
most visible changes that have occurred. The shareholdings of banks and
insurance companies that have been traditionally management-friendly
have substantially declined in the last two decades.87 During the same
period, foreign shareholdings have substantially increased, though more
recently some downward trends were also reported.88
Long-Term Employment
After the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, long-term
employment has come under pressure as a result of economic recession.
Economic decline required Japanese companies to be more flexible in
hiring and firing employees than the traditional system allowed. Many
companies have decided to lay off a substantial number of employees in
the process of restructuring companies while, in the same period, the
number of part-time employees has substantially increased.8 9 In fact, the
largest difference in long-term employment in the last ten years has been
the increase in part-time employees. 90 Since Japan has always had part-
time employees in large companies, this is a change in scale and not in
form.
86. Kaho Shimizu, Triangular Mergers in Japan: Are New Rules Kind to Hostile
Mergers? JAPAN TIMEs, May 1, 2007, available at http://search.japantimes.cojp/cgi-
bin/Inn20070501il.html (last visited June 21, 2011).
87. Stock ownership by banks declined to 4.9% in 2009, from 15.1% in 1997. In the
same period stock ownership by financial institutions declined to 32.4% from 41.9%.
However, a slight reverse trend is noticeable in the last few years. See generally Tokyo
Stock Exchange, Fact Book, p. 64 (2010), available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/
market/data/factbook/b7gje60000003o32-att/factbook 2010.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2010).
88. According to Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book, supra note 87, foreign
shareholding in 2009 was 23.6%, down from 28% in 2007. Nitta, supra note 84,
provides information indicating that after the Lehman collapse in September 2008, there
has been a substantial decline of foreign institutional shareholding (from 14.1% in fiscal
2007 to 11.82% in fiscal 2008).
89. According to the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry for Internal Affairs and
Communication figures, there were 33.55 million or 65.7% regular employees in Japan in
2010, while non-regular employees numbered 17.55 million, or 34.3% of the total. See
Table 1-1 Employee Excluding Executive of Company or Corporation by Type of
Employment, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudoulzuhyou/edt0l 1.xls.
90. The key characteristic of part-time employment in Japan is the fact that the
employee is not a regular employee, regardless of the number of working hours. Part-
time employees are often hired by a fixed term contract, and they are disposable
according to the fluctuation of business. The same is true of other fixed-term employees
(often called "kikan-jugyoin" or "keiyaku-shain') who may work full time but are
definitely non-regular workers.
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It has been repeatedly argued that long-term employment is
disappearing, or even that it does not exist anymore.9 ' Despite such
claims, many employees still believe today that they are employed for
the rest of their working life at their company unless something goes
very wrong. Although employment customs are said to be changing,
there is still a pervasive belief that it is only really morally acceptable to
resort to layoffs when the company faces bankruptcy. This informal
understanding has been supported in a number of court cases.92 Recently
some large listed companies have even gradually switched back to
traditional long-term employment. This new tendency might be part of
the change of corporate strategies regarding human resources, taking into
account failure in the merit system.
Although the economy will probably further suffer as a
consequence of the global financial crisis that started in 2008, it is
unlikely that the long-term system will be abandoned, though it may be
further modified. Employment practices will probably remain one
important segment of the Japanese model of corporate governance that
has not converged with the American model, and it is not likely to
converge in the foreseeable future.
Legal Reform of Corporate Governance
A sweeping reform of Japanese corporate-governance laws was
introduced in 2002. There are several important changes that have been
introduced in the existing corporate management structure. 93 Most of the
debate on reforms has revolved around the clash between the American
model, which is geared towards placing primary importance on
shareholders and relying on external control, and the traditional Japanese
model, which is primarily a stakeholder model based on internal control.
Under the new Corporation Law which entered into force in May 2006,
taking the Company Law outside the Commercial Code,94 Japanese
corporations are given the option to select from two distinct corporate
governance regimes-the Reformed Large Corporation, based on
conventional Japanese model, and the New Type Company with
committees with an executive officer ("CEO"), based on the American
91. See Wolff, supra note 25.
92. See Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Long-term Employment: Between Cultural
Background and Economic Rationale, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA (Gerald
McAlinn and Caslav Pejovic eds., Routledge, forthcoming).
93. A detailed analysis of reforms introduced by the Corporation Law, 2006 is found
in Eiji Takahashi & Madoka Shimizu, Does the 2005 Reform Improve the Japanese
Economy? The Current of Japanese Corporate Governance Reform, 17 J. INTERDIS.
ECON. (2005).
94. , Law No. 86/2005.
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model. The biggest innovation was the establishment of a totally new
governance structure known as the "Committee System," which was
viewed by some scholars as a sign of the Americanization of Japanese
corporate governance.96
Outside directors have been in the centre of discussion and legal
reforms as an attempt aimed at the improvement of monitoring. The
Tokyo Stock Exchange ("TSE") has also regulated participation of
independent directors. TSE Securities Listing Regulations (as of March,
2010) by Rule 436-2 provide for obligations of the companies listed at
TSE to ensure at least one independent director/auditor (meaning an
outside director/auditor prescribed in Article 2(15) and Article 2(16) of
the Corporation Law of 2005, respectively) who is unlikely to have
conflicts of interest with shareholders.9 7 Since the TSE Rules leave the
choice between directors and auditors, majority companies have opted to
appoint auditors, who are not typically independent. The report of the
TSE, based on notifications on appointment of independent
directors/auditors, published on July 21, 2010, shows that out of the
listed companies which submitted ID/A notifications and had already
secured ID/A(s), 10.6% submitted notifications containing only
independent directors, 70.7% contained only independent auditors, and
18.7% contained both independent directors and auditors. So, the TSE
Rules on independent directors/auditors, which declared better protection
of shareholders as its goal, seem to be just another fagade in the Japanese
corporate governance system, as the main goal of having independently
minded persons that would protect shareholders is compromised by
allowing companies to appoint auditors who are not necessarily
independent.
Hostile takeovers were also the subject of legal reforms. In 2005
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Justice
issued the "Guidelines Regarding Takeover Defense for the Purpose of
Protection and Enhancement of Corporate Value and Shareholders'
95. Article 2 of the new Corporation Law provides (Definitions): (10) "Corporation
with a Board of Auditors" shall mean a kabushiki kaisha which has established a Board
of Auditors or a kabushiki kaisha in which the establishment of a Board of Auditors is
required based on the provisions of this Law; (12) "Corporation with Committees" shall
mean a kabushiki kaisha which has established a nomination committee, an audit
committee and a compensation committee [hereinafter "the committees"].
96. For more information on the 2002 Revision, see Roland Gilson & Curtis
Milhaupt, Choice as a Regulatory Reform: The case ofJapanese Corporate Governance
(COLUM. L. & EcoN., Working Paper No. 251, 2004).
97. See Tokyo Stock Exchange, Updated Consolidated Results of Independent
Directors/Auditors Notifications, July 21, 2010, available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/
news/09/b7gje6000000817j-att/100803_a.pdf.
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Common Interests," aimed at creating rules for takeover defenses." The
Guidelines give specific examples of defenses, along with conditions
governing their use. In principle, defenses are legitimate if they serve the
interest of shareholders, and not if their goal is merely to secure the
position of incumbent management. The Guidelines were clearly
influenced by American law. However, the way the rules on hostile
takeovers function is also determined by business and legal
infrastructure, which is quite different between the United States and
Japan: the relationship between shareholders and management is very
different, the status of independent directors who may play a key role in
any hostile takeover attempts is also very different, as well as the role of
the courts. It remains to be seen how Japanese courts will cope with this
challenging issue.
For the moment, the corporate-governance reforms have not led to
radical changes in the board, the presence of outside directors has not yet
been adopted as a standard, and stock options and hostile takeovers are
still a rarity in Japan.99 Meetings of shareholders, however, have become
more serious, indicating a greater readiness to accommodate the interests
of shareholders. There is a growing tendency of individual shareholders
attending the annual meetings and becoming more active at those
meetings, often asking questions. Asset-management companies and
trust banks were more active at this year's annual shareholders' meetings
by voting against the management proposals. 00 At average, 15% of the
management proposals were voted against, in comparison with 10% last
year.'0 Those proposals included retirement allowances to directors,
nomination of management and proposals for issue of warrants aimed as
protection device against hostile takeovers. As a result, the duration of
the meetings have also become longer, and in June 2010 the average
duration of annual meetings was fifty minutes-seventeen minutes
longer than in June 1999.102
It is still premature to make predictions about the impact of legal
reforms of corporate governance in Japan. Time will tell whether the
98. See Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry & Ministry of Justice, Guidelines
Regarding Takeover Defense for the Purposes of Protection and Enhancement of
Corporate Value and Shareholders' Common Interests, May 25, 2005, available at
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/keiei-innovation/keizaihousei/pdf/shishin-hontai.p
df
99. See Puchniak, supra note 11 at 195.
100. ES1 = , 15%1:MatWJ (H .INI * 9/24/2010) (at the Annual
Meetings of Shareholders, 15% voted against) (Nihon Keizai Shinbun September, 24,
2010).
101. See id.
102. M*Mg 1 916% at 13 (Nov. 30, 2010). The information on duration of annual
shareholders meetings which is regularly published in the November issue of Shoji Homu
(M$MA). However, it indicates no substantial change in the last four years.
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present legal reforms will end up in failure, just a "formal convergence"
without substantially changing the way of doing things, or whether they
will bring substantial changes.
FACTORS OF CHANGE
When discussing reasons that lie behind the changes in the Japanese
corporate-governance system, several challenging questions may be
raised. Why has Japanese corporate governance remained stagnant in the
postwar period until the 1980s, and why have legal norms that have been
dormant for about forty years suddenly started to be applied? Have the
Japanese courts and judges suddenly become aware of the tools they
have had in their hands for almost forty years, but have never resorted to
using? What is the impact of economic decline on the legal reforms? To
answer these questions it is necessary to identify the relevant social,
political, economic and legal factors that play a role in these changes.
Social Factors
In recent years, the informal practices of corporate governance
based on non-legal norms came under pressure as a result of
globalization, which brought about various changes in the Japanese
business and social environment. Japan has been gradually transformed,
especially in the urban portion of society and among the younger
generation, which is naturally more inclined to accept changes and
foreign influences. Younger Japanese have ideas about their careers that
are different from those of their parents. They are less committed to
long-term employment and are more likely to change companies if others
offer better conditions. In the process of restructuring, employees and
managers have gradually adjusted to the previously painful experiences
brought about by mergers. o0 This also indicates the gradual
modernization of Japanese society from being family- and group-
oriented towards an individual-oriented society that gradually adopts
Western standards.104
The attitude of the Japanese towards law has also been changing for
the past several decades. At the time many legal reforms were being
introduced, the readiness to use those legal norms was still lacking. Over
103. The identification with the company was one cause of the problems with mergers
in Japan, and difficulties in full integration between two companies. Dai-Ichi Bank and
Nihon Kangyo Bank, which formed Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, is often quoted as an
illustration of those difficulties, since employees of these two banks continued to identify
themselves with their original banks long after the merger and the banks continued to
have two separate branches operating side-by-side under the same roof.
104. See Masako Ishii-Kuntz, Collectivism or Individualism? Changing Patterns of
Japanese Attitudes, 73 SOCIOL. & Soc. RESEARCH 174-179 (1989).
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time, things have changed as a result of the globalization process at the
international level, and the urbanization of Japan at the national level,
which resulted in the weakening of social ties in society and a more open
attitude to the changes that were coming from the outside world. In
particular, after the 1970s, the Japanese became increasingly ready and
willing to resort to law as an instrument for dispute resolution. This can
be seen from the increase in the number of cases litigated.10 5  The
relevance of non-legal norms may be decreasing, corresponding to the
increased role of the law in Japanese society.
The appearance of some shareholder activists, such as Takafumi
Horie (known as "Horiemon"), the founder of Livedor corporation, and
Yoshiaki Murakami, an outspoken investment fund manager, is an
illustration of the change of attitudes within Japan. Both of them were in
the center of a number of highly publicized stories, such as the attempt at
a hostile takeover of NBS (Nippon Broadcasting System), which
represented a sign of departing from the traditional and accepting the
new ways of doing things. 06
Some non-profit organizations are also active in promoting reforms
of corporate governance. One such organization is the Kabunushi
(Shareholders) Ombudsman ("KO") which is comprised of lawyers,
accountants, academics and shareholders. It aims to reform Japanese
management practices to incorporate the views of all shareholders in
Japanese companies. 0 7  In addition, one part of large business also
showed readiness to embrace new ways of doing things. A notable
example is Sony, which introduced its Shikkoyakuin (Executive Officer)
system in 1997 that served as a model for the New Type Company. 0 8
More recently, there are signs that Japan's real estate investment trusts
(J-REIT) may also become active players in takeovers.'09
Political Factors
The Japanese version of capitalism is, to a certain extent, similar to
the planned economy, a kind of controlled capitalism with industrial
105. See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 64.
106. Nippon Hoso K.K. v. Raibudoa K.K., 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU 125 (Tokyo High
Ct., Mar. 23, 2005) (Appeal from Injunction Against Issuance of Warrants).
107. See generally Kabunushi (Shareholders) Ombudsman (KO): http://kabuombu.
sakura.ne.jp/.
108. See Sony, Corporate Governance Reform Report 2003, available at
http://www.sony.net/Sonylnfo/csr/issues/report/2003/qfhh7cOOOOOdlrp8-attle_2003
03.pdf (last visited on Feb. 7, 2010).
109. See Tomoko Yamazaki & Katsuyo Kuwako, Japanese REITs to Accelerate
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policy as an important tool for directing development. In theory, the
Japanese model has been described as a "developmental state."" 0 It is
based on partnership between politicians, bureaucrats and
businesspersons, which is often termed the "iron triangle," comprising
big business, the ruling political party, and the bureaucracy. The Diet is
considered an extension of the bureaucracy, and Japan is sometimes
referred to as a "government of administration" rather than a government
of laws.' Some segments of the Japanese government, particularly the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, play active
roles in regulating and monitoring the Japanese corporate world. This
demonstrates the important role of the political factors in the Japanese
economic model.
While in the post-War period, the American corporate governance
model was imposed on Japan; in subsequent periods, the Japanese actors
designed independently the corporate governance policy. This task was
carried out not only by regulating and monitoring activities, but also by
exercising influence on the way the regulations are implemented in
practice.
As Japan was improving its economic performance, particularly
since the 1970s, there was a return to "wakon-yosai" rhetoric in a new
form-nihonjinron. These new theories, which were officially endorsed
by the Nakasone Government in the 1980s, emphasized Japanese
specificity uniqueness as a positive model for a Japanese road towards
modernity and its global outreach.1 2 While the key elements of the
Japanese corporate governance were, in fact, based on a rational choice,
they were given a cultural explanation." 3  This kind of cultural
nationalism may be explained by a huge economic success of Japan at
that time, which boosted the Japanese pride.
After Japan entered into the so-called 'lost decade' (which turned to
be lost decades), political rhetoric changed. In the 1990s, kaikaku
(reform) became the new keyword."14 Most comprehensive legal reforms
of corporate governance were carried out during the mandate of the
Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006), who supported the idea of
embracing the American model, which was supposed to go in parallel
110. "Developmental state" is a term used by political-economy scholars to refer to
the phenomenon of state-led macroeconomic planning in East Asia in the late twentieth
century.
111. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS? THE RISE OF DEVELOPMENTAL
STATE 140 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995).
112. See DALE, supra note 78, at 213.
113. See Dimitry Vanoverbeke & Jeroen Maesschalck, A Public Policy on Judicial
Reform in Japan, ZJAPANR, 11, 21 (2009).
114. See id. at 32.
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with deregulating the corporate sector based on the ideology of neo-
liberalism.
Things have changed again after defeat of the Liberal Democratic
Party ("LDP") in the elections held in 2009. The Democratic Party of
Japan ("DPJ") won the elections by using new rhetoric based on social
justice and deploring the ideas of "market fundamentalism" promoted by
the previous Government. The DPJ introduced several reforms which
were based on a stronger social-welfare policy.'15  Some recent
developments, such as the Japan Post's offer of permanent employment
to 65,000 of its part-time employees, indicate that long-term employment
may have a comeback under the new Government.116 However, the
popularity of the DPJ has started to fall already in 2010, resulting in its
rather poor performance in elections held in July 2010. These
developments on the Japanese political scene will continue to play an
important role in designing legal reforms, including those affecting
corporate governance.
Economic Factors
There have also been important changes in some economic factors,
mainly as result of economic decline. The traditional features of the
Japanese corporate model - the keiretsu, the main bank system and long-
term employment - all suffered setbacks as a result of the prolonged
economic crisis. The shareholdings of stable shareholders significantly
declined in the 1990s, while foreign shareholdings increased. Faced with
the problem of bad debts, a number of banks had to dispose of substantial
parts of their shareholdings. This has affected the monitoring process in
companies, so that the monitoring function of shareholders may become
stronger as a replacement for the reduced role of the banks as monitors.
The crisis has also affected the long-term employment system, so now
the Japanese people have learned to live with the new reality where there
is no strong guarantee of long-term employment. Economic decline was
one of the key factors that pushed legal reforms since 1990s and is likely
to continue to do so.
115. See Kan Urges Opposition Parties to Join Talks on Social Secrurity Refrom, THE
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, available at
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/201lO124p2gOOmOdmO68000c.html.
116. See Japan Post to make 65,000 Non-Regular employees Full-Time Workers,
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Legalfactors
The role of law is becoming more prominent alongside the process
of globalization and modernization of Japanese society. Legal reforms
relating to Japanese corporate governance have been numerous and often
comprehensive, affecting many aspects of corporate governance. Most
reforms in Japan have been motivated by the need to change the existing
practices. The main factor in the recent reforms was the need for
overcoming the economic decline that has continued for over a decade.
The experience with legal reforms in Japan has shown that even if
the reforms do not bring immediate changes, they may still bring results
at a later stage. Law often serves as a complement rather than a
substitute for non-legal norms. That is a sign of a gradual process of
reform of a society, which enables a smooth transition from a society
governed by social norms towards society governed by legal norms.
An important step towards a greater role of law in Japan has been
the establishment of the Justice System Reform Council in 2001. The
Council recommended substantial reforms to the Japanese legal system,
including changes in legal education and increases in the number of
lawyers. As result of such reforms, it may be expected that the law will
play an increasingly important role in coming years.
LIMITATION FACTORS
In Japan, a common opinion is that there is much reform but not
much transformation. The impression is that Japanese legislators have
undertaken reforms as a kind of fashion in order to show that they make
efforts to restructure the existing system to make it more efficient. The
extent and effect of these reforms seems to be designed in a way to adjust
the existing model in order to preserve it rather than to subject it to a
substantial change. Some legal reforms in Japan had only a symbolic
effect, while others brought changes only many years after they were
introduced. Cultural barriers often posed obstacles or delayed actual
change, particularly when cultural factors were aligned with the interests
of the business elite. This can be viewed from a different perspective
that cultural arguments were used as rhetoric to mask the actual interests
of the business elite that opposed the changes.
Despite comprehensive legal reforms, traditional patterns endure,
and the fundamental elements of Japanese corporate governance have not
changed."' 7 It is very difficult to implement legal reforms that would
transform the stakeholder model into a shareholders model. The social
role of corporations is too deeply rooted to be easily changed. Large
117. Haley, supra note 3.
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corporations continue to be controlled by the managers who effectively
prevent shareholders from exercising control over them. On the other
hand, the shareholders traditionally do not show much ambition to
interfere with the job of managers.
One of the key elements of the Japanese corporate governance
reforms is the introduction of outside directors. Outside directors,
however, failed to play a substantial role in monitoring. While outside
directors are seen as a potentially powerful new element of monitoring,
such expectations may prove to be too optimistic. It makes little sense to
have outside directors who are not really independent and have no real
power to influence the decision-making processes. Some companies
may decide to incorporate outside directors precisely because they do not
consider them to be a threat to the management power. On the other
hand, having outside directors may be useful to attract institutional
shareholders from the US or the UK, as they feel more comfortable to
invest in the companies that have outside directors.
Japanese companies may find it difficult to integrate outside
directors, at least in the initial period. It is unlikely that Japanese
companies will adopt a system in which outside directors will play the
dominant role. This would be contrary to Japanese corporate culture,
which is inherently biased against the presence of outsiders given the
tradition of board members having longstanding and close personal
relationships with each other. The opposition to outside directors is, in
fact, motivated by the interests of the business elite rather than being
determined by cultural factors, even though such attitude fits cultural
patterns towards outsiders. Why would powerful senior managers adopt
a system that would reduce their power by placing some key decisions
under the authority of outside directors? The importance of this aspect of
Japanese business culture may prove to be a stumbling block for a
system of external control based on outside directors." 8
The opposition to comprehensive reforms that would impose a
stricter control over management was obvious during recent legal
reforms. The logical question .is then: why were Japanese companies
given an option to adopt the New Type Company, rather than it being
imposed as a mandatory requirement? The flexibility offered by
Japanese reforms can be attributed to powerful industry groups led by
Keidanren, which supported greater discretion of the management and
opposed the initiative for stricter monitoring of management. During the
118. This is illustrated by the extremely small percentage of Japanese companies that
have adopted the US-style board structure-which requires a minimum of two outside
directors, see Puchniak, supra note 12, at 256-57. See also Peter Lawley, Panacea or
Placebo? An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Japanese Committee System
Corporate Governance Law Reform, 9 AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 105, 112 (2007).
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process of adoption of the new Corporation Law, Hiroshi Okuda, the
Chairman of Toyota, who also served as the Chairman of Keidanren,
expressed a view that reforms in Toyota should go in the direction of
strengthening internal control, rather than introducing outside control." 9
Fujio Mitarai, the President of Canon, who replaced Okuda as the
Chairman of Keidanren, held identical views, taking the stance that
Canon does not need outside directors to achieve more efficient
management. 120
The importance of this attitude of the major part of the business elite
should not be underestimated, and it may pose a serious obstacle to more
comprehensive changes within the country. Additionally, the harsh court
sentences handed to T. Horie and Y. Murakami in 2007 raised questions
about the reasons behind the Japanese court's attitude, which is usually
lenient in the case of corporate crimes.121 These sentences might be
interpreted as a warning for those who consider challenging the
traditional ways of doing things.
Legal reforms have had a limited impact so far and have not
substantially changed existing business practices in Japan. Analysis of
the legal reforms made in Japan indicates that, despite adopting some
elements of the American corporate-governance system, Japan has
retained the most important features of its traditional model. The firm
continues to be controlled by its top management, while shareholders are
still deprived of effective mechanisms of control over the corporation, so
not many things have really changed in practice. No legal reform can
easily change the traditional ways of doing things, such as nemawashi.
Then, how can the Japanese model converge with the American one
when the process of making decisions remains quite divergent? These
informal ways are deeply rooted in the Japanese way of doing things and
cannot be changed overnight through legislation.
One possible explanation of the slow adoption of legal transplants in
the case of Japan and some other countries in East Asia is that the
Western law is based on concepts that are, to a great extent, alien to the
traditional norms of those societies. This issue is beyond the scope of
this paper, but a basic explanation might be helpful for better
understanding of the issues discussed here. The main features of
119. See TOYOTA, ANNUAL REPORT (2003) at 32.
120. In order to realize a more streamlined and efficient management decision-
making process, Canon has not adopted an outside director system. See CANON, ANNUAL
REPORT 6 (2004).
121. T. Horie was found guilty of falsifying the company's accounts and misleading
investors and was sentenced to a two-year, six-month sentence:
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2007O319al.html. Y. Murakami, was sentenced
to two years in prison for insider stock trading: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nb2007O720a l.html.
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Western culture that influenced its legal culture are individualism and
rationalism. Individualism means that the personal autonomy and rights
of individuals must be protected, often against the larger group, the State
and society. This idea is in fundamental contradiction with the idea of
collectivism and submission of an individual to the community, which is
typical for Confucian philosophy. Under the concept of rationalism,
conduct of the people should be governed by the rule of reason, meaning
an objective standard of conduct based on reality and usefulness. In the
Japanese context, rationalism has a different meaning and is related to
"giri"-a kind of obligation that arises from a social interaction with
other persons. 122 As a consequence of these differences, transplantation
of Western law to the Japanese society resulted in a legal system that
functioned in Japan in a different way than its Western model.
In societies where social norms are strong, top-down legal reforms
must be done very carefully in order to not cause damage to well-
functioning markets. In order for real change to occur, there should be a
consensus in society that those informal ways are outdated and an
agreement on the need to start a new way of doing things. So far, no
such consensus and agreement have been achieved in Japan. This has
been demonstrated by the contents of the amendments to the Special Act
to the Commercial Code (Shoho-tokurei-ho) in 2002, which allowed two
models of company to exist in parallel; when a consensus cannot be
achieved, a compromise is used.
A note of caution is needed when legal norms and principles, as
applied in one country, are transplanted into the legal system of another.
People often wrongly assume that "if rules are made to resemble each
other something significant by way of rapprochement has been
accomplished."1 2 3 In order to have an effective legal transplant, the law
has to fit well in the new environment, so that it can be absorbed by the
society and implemented into practice. Otherwise, the so-called
"transplant effect" may be expected, which means that the law
transplanted in this way would not be widely used, at least in the initial
period.
POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Japanese attitudes are likely to change as society becomes
increasingly commercialized and exposed to the globalization process.
122. For a detailed explanation of giri, see YOsHUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO
JAPANESE LAW 174-83 (University of Tokyo Press, 1976). See also MERYLL DEAN,
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 17-20 (Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 2002).
123. John Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the
Common Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EURoPRE 223 (Cappelletti
ed., 1978).
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Although significant changes in values and attitudes are likely to happen
slowly, they carry a potential for change that may undermine the
traditional ways of doing things in Japan.
The family-like company will probably continue to exist in Japan,
but this kind of concept of a company will most likely become weaker as
a result of new trends, including the changing social values and attitudes
of the Japanese people. Social changes do not, however, necessarily
mean that the informal norms and structures will disappear. In reality,
they persist, and no substantial changes have occurred so far.
Increased foreign shareholding needs careful consideration - will it
lead to more control over management? While this development may
contain a potential for change, it is premature to make predictions. A
substantial part of foreign shareholdings is, in fact, in the hands of
institutional shareholders who do not show much interest for active
participation in management. They would have to join hands with local
Japanese shareholders in order to be able to have an impact, and this may
not be an easy task.
Probably no substantial change in the direction of the American
model will happen as long as the main features of the Japanese business
culture remain unchanged. It is unlikely that a majority of Japanese
companies will adopt the American model company, and even those
companies that have adopted it may soon realize that such a model may
not be effective when operating within the traditional Japanese business
environment. There will be some adjustments to the Japanese model, but
those will probably be more "cosmetic" than radical.
Despite the persistence being demonstrated by the traditional and
informal ways of doing things in Japan, it would be misleading to believe
that the Japanese corporate culture remains static and inflexible. Over
the years, there have been gradual changes aimed at meeting the new
trends and challenges brought about by the globalization process and the
rapidly changing environment. The changes introduced by the new legal
reforms are significant, but the companies may need some time to digest
those changes and make necessary adjustments.
Japanese corporate governance may need to make further and real
adjustments in order to attract more foreign investors. Companies may,
eventually, become increasingly exposed to the impact of the market and
may not be able to afford to keep excess employees. As a result, instead
of long-term, profit-oriented governance, the short-term governance
aimed at improving value of shares may become more important to
companies.
Japanese corporate governance is changing in a significant and
often unpredictable way. Uncertainty is more about the extent and pace
of changes, rather than whether the changes are necessary and in what
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direction the changes will lead the Japanese corporate model. Based on
the assessment of various factors of change analyzed above, it can be
expected that in the coming years, the non-legal norms will gradually
weaken at the expense of the increased importance that will be given to
the formal legal norms.
CONCLUSION
Legal regulation of corporate governance in the post-war period in
Japan has been continuously influenced by the American model. In the
same period, the way it functioned in practice significantly deviated from
the American model. This divergence between the legal norms and their
implementation in practice remained largely outside debate on the
Japanese corporate governance.
Discussions on both divergence and convergence usually focus on
legal rules. But such focus is often misplaced because legal rules are
only one segment of a legal system. The law plays a crucial role in
designing the Japanese corporate governance system, but the role of law
cannot be fully understood without considering the social and
institutional aspect of a national legal system, particularly the role of
non-legal norms.
Developments in corporate governance in Japan are too complex to
be explained by a single factor. This author takes a middle way by
recognizing the relevance of cultural, economic, legal and political
factors as major determinants that have shaped Japanese corporate
governance-Japanese corporate governance can be properly understood
only by giving adequate attention to all relevant factors. While economic
interests may have been the driving force behind the adoption of some of
the key features of Japanese corporate governance, such as cross-
shareholding and lifetime employment, they were accepted by all
relevant actors and integrated well in the Japanese corporate world
because those features were well suited for Japanese ways of doing
things. Full understanding of the interaction between social norms on
one hand and economic, legal and political factors on the other hand is
key for understanding the Japanese model; any approach limited to only
certain of these factors could be misleading and incomplete.
An issue that is open to discussion is to what extent the Japanese
legal system has converged on the Western models.12 4 There is no doubt
that progress has been made in that direction. However, this does not
124. The existence of Western models has been questioned, as corporate governance
models in the West are also undergoing significant changes. See Dan Puchniak, The
Japanization ofAmerican Corporate Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending History
of Corporate Law, 9 AsIAN-PAC. L & POL'Y J. 7 (2007).
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mean that, today, the law in Japan plays an identical role as in the West.
In the case of corporate governance, a number of issues have to be
examined in order to make a proper assessment. For example, do the
BOD and Meeting of Shareholders perform their functions in the same
way as in the West? Do they strictly follow legal norms, or are they still
under the influence of informal bodies and practices, such asjomukai and
nemawashi? Have keiretsu and the Japanese pattern of long-term
employment ceased to be important features of the Japanese corporate
governance? Until clear evidence is produced that such informal bodies
and practices have ceased to play an important role in the Japanese
corporate governance, the argument that the Japanese model operates in
the same way as the West's will remain questionable.
When discussing the relationship between legal and non-legal
norms in the context of changes, one of the key questions is how to
measure changes in law and practice. The assumption that the legal
model is identical with the actual model used in practice might be wrong.
There is a contrast between the law-driven Western model and the
relationship-driven Japanese model. Instead of focusing on changes in
law, it may be more appropriate to consider changes in actual practice
and changes in social norms. But this kind of change may also be more
difficult to evaluate. Another difficult task would be to evaluate the link
between changes in law and changes in practice. So, it is not surprising
that there are substantial differences in opinion about the actual effect of
legal reforms on Japanese corporate governance.
Another question is whether, behind the facade of Westernization,
Japan had undergone any kind of significant transformation and whether
it has accepted the idea of law and justice as they are understood in the
West. It can be argued that there is friction between the imported
Western legal system on one hand and traditional Japanese morals and
values on the other, but it may not be as strong as believed by many
foreigners. Japan has made a successful merger of Western concepts of
law while preserving its own traditional values. After all, Japan is
known for its skills to adopt foreign models and adjust them to its needs.
The corporate model before the newest reforms looked like many
Western models; but behind that fagade, the actual way of functioning of
that model was very much based on the Japanese way of doing things.
While the globalization process has an impact on Japanese society and
the attitudes of Japanese people, some distinctly different Japanese
attitudes will continue to exist. Time will show whether behind the new
fagade there is also a real change, or if it is just a new fagade covering
the traditional way of doing things.
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